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1 Introduction 
Japan ' s capital markets have played a crucial role in the recent increase in the globalization of 
international capital markets. As a result it has become important to understand the similarities 
and differences in the way Japanese markets operate in comparison to the more familiar Anglo-
American environment. 
One of the major differences tha t has at tracted a great deal of attention is the relatively high 
average price/earnings [PE] ratio (Viner [1988]) for the stocks listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. 
A question sometimes raised in the popular press is whether the difference in PEs suggests tha t 
US stocks are undervalued or Japanese stocks are overvalued.1 Of course, such conjectures are 
not well-founded unless we understand the differences in the institutional characteristics of the 
two markets. Some of the differences raise subtle but important questions, such as whether a 
particular institutional arrangement can be adopted in other environments. Just as we have seen 
the transfer of US accounting practices to non-US companies active in international capital markets, 
certain institutional characteristics of Japan 's capital markets might lead to related changes in other 
countries. This paper considers one such characteristic, management forecasts, which we believe to 
be a likely candidate for such a global transfer. 
In Japan, the securities exchanges request tha t management provide forecasts of sales, earnings 
and dividends. Although the forecasts are technically voluntary, almost all Japanese companies 
provide them. In contrast, relatively few US firms seem to publish forecasts.2 If the Japanese 
forecasts are reasonably accurate and used by investors, then even non-Japanese companies might 
be "encouraged" to prepare management forecasts on a regular basis. 
Evaluation of the relevance of management forecasts is also important in understanding the dif-
ference between Japanese and US PEs. Although the difference since 1986 appears to be enormous, 
there is no consensus so far as to whether the PEs are really different once "proper" adjustments 
are made. For example, Aron [1987, 1989] has consistently argued tha t "adjusted" P E ratios are 
1For a recent example, see "Abreast of the Market" in The Wall Street Journal, September 6, 1989 pp. C1-C2. 
2For example, the survey by Lees [1981] found that only 10.4% of the surveyed firms (total of 397 firms) disclosed 
forecasts. See also the samples in Waymire [1984] or Baginski [1987]. 
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virtually identical in the two countries.3 Others such as Scheinemann [1988, 1989], and Poterba 
and French [1989] arrive at the opposite conclusion, despite making similar adjustments. All these 
calculations are based on historic earnings. Yet, if prices reflect expected earnings, and manage-
ment forecasts of earnings are relevant in Japan, then it is necessary to examine how these forecasts 
affect stock prices. This investigation may then help us in evaluating the Japanese PE "anomaly" 
in a more precise manner. 
Two questions must be answered in order to assess the relevance of Japanese management 
forecasts. First, how accurate are the management forecasts? If the forecasts are inaccurate 
we should not expect them to be useful to investors. We compare the predictive accuracy of 
management forecasts with a simple random walk model, since all the research we have found on 
the association between unexpected earnings and security returns in Japan has used such a model 
as the benchmark (e.g. Kunimura [1986], Ito [1988] and Sakakibara, et al. [1988]). 
Clearly, while predictive accuracy is presumably necessary (Penman [1980]), it is not sufficient 
in order to claim that management forecasts are important for investors. Thus the second question 
considered is whether investors actually use these forecasts in pricing securities. To answer this 
question we investigate whether management forecasts provide additional "news" at the time of 
their release, by estimating the price reaction around the date of forecast announcement. 
The procedure we follow requires a careful sorting of various information releases by Japanese 
companies. Two disclosure practices must be noted: (1) many companies disclose parent and 
consolidated financial statements at different times; and (2) those that provide forecasts announce 
both realized and forecast figures simultaneously. Disclosure of both parent and consolidated values 
suggests that there are two potential earnings "news" dates. Simultaneous announcement of both 
historical and forecast data necessitates that we first discriminate and control for the reaction to 
the realized earnings. To provide the maximum control for tests of the reaction to forecast earnings, 
we consider unexpected earnings measures based on historic and forecast earnings as well as the 
3Aron's claim is based mainly on two types of adjustments. First, he uses aggregate data to adjust Japanese 
earnings to conform more closely to US generally accepted accounting principles. Second, he incorporates different 
growth and discount rates into a capitalization rate. He has made these calculations periodically since 1979. 
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latest "analyst" forecasts.4 Consequently, the study also provides some evidence on the relevance 
of these analyst forecasts. 
The evidence we provide in this paper suggests (1) that management forecasts of both parent 
and consolidated earnings are generally more accurate than the widely used random walk model, 
and (2) that investors appear to use both management forecasts in pricing securities. 
Section 2 of the paper discusses some institutional background and presents the basic hypothe-
ses. We describe the sample and test procedures in Section 3. The predictive accuracy tests and 
results are reported in Section 4, and the price reaction studies are presented in Section 5. We 
summarize the findings and conclude the paper in Section 6. 
2 Background Information and Hypo theses 
Japan's Commercial Code requires companies to prepare unconsolidated annual reports within three 
months of the fiscal year end (FYE). The Securities and Exchange Law, which covers companies 
listed on the securities exchanges, has also required listed companies to submit consolidated reports 
since FYE March 31, 1978.5 These consolidated reports are generally submitted after the parent-
only reports, and are required to be published within four months of the FYE.6 
These two are the only reports legally required, but the securities exchanges require companies 
to announce a brief summary of current financial information including sales, earnings and dividends 
in a press release (Kessan Tanshin). In addition, they request management to provide forecasts 
and most companies comply.7 These announcements are made for both parent and consolidated 
results so that we frequently have two separate announcements and forecasts. Figure 1 provides a 
summary of the disclosures and their timing for a typical company. 
4The term "analyst" forecast should not be interpreted as being equivalent to an US analyst forecast. As explained 
in Section 3 of the paper we use the forecasts provided by Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Nikkei) analysts. Their officials 
explained that the forecasts are not made in a manner similar to a detailed US forecast, and are frequently based on 
management's own estimates. 
5Although consolidated reports were required from 1978, the use of equity accounting for unconsolidated affiliates 
has only been required since 1983. 
6As of FYE March 31, 1988, listed companies will be required to submit the parent and consolidated reports 
simultaneously. 
7Kunimura [1986] reports a survey which found that more than 90 percent of firms (March 31, 1981 FYEs and 
listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange) provided management forecasts of sales and earnings. 
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The parent-only report submitted to the Ministry of Finance (Yuka Shoken Hokokusho) is 
a document with detailed disclosures, while the equivalent consolidated report (Renketsu Yuka 
Shoken Hokokusho) contains considerably less detail. The parent-only report has generally been 
considered to be the one on which many users rely (Viner [1988]).8 Thus, a question arises as to 
whether consolidated earnings have any marginal information over the parent-only earnings. Using 
small samples with historical data , Ishizuka [1987] and Ito [1988] show tha t both the changes in 
consolidated and in parent-only earnings explain some of the variation in market-adjusted (abnor-
mal) returns. Thus consolidated earnings would appear to have marginal information content. A 
problem with these, and most other information content studies using Japanese data , is tha t they 
ignore the forecasts when measuring unexpected earnings (UE). Although Kunimura [1986] and 
Ishizuka [1987] have performed some preliminary analysis on the relevance of parent-only manage-
ment forecasts, the question of earnings expectation models and the relevance of forecasts in Japan 
has largely been ignored and remains unresolved (Ito [1988] p.8). 
As mentioned in the introduction, interest in the relevance of management forecasts (MFs) of 
earnings goes beyond the methodological choice of an earnings expectations model. We believe 
it is an important question because the answer may not only provide important insights for the 
analysis of the high Japanese PEs , but also influence the institutional setup of capital markets in 
other countries. 
The basic question of interest is whether Japanese management forecasts are relevant to in-
vestors. This question is broken down into separate pieces tha t are formulated into three hypothe-
ses. The first relates to the degree of MF accuracy. If MFs have a higher predictive accuracy than 
a simple random walk model, then we should expect the forecasts to provide a bet ter measure of 
UE than the naive model generally used. Thus the first hypothesis to be tested is: 
H^: Management forecasts of earnings are no more accurate than forecasts based on a simple 
random walk model. 
The alternative hypothesis is tha t the MFs are more accurate. This null hypothesis is evaluated 
interestingly, the widely publicized PE ratios (e.g. as in Morgan Stanley Capital International Perspectives) are 
usually based on the parent-only earnings. 
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separately for parent and consolidated earnings. 
Of course, predictive accuracy alone is not sufficient to conclude that investors use the infor-
mation. Hence we consider next whether MFs provide incremental information in explaining the 
association between unexpected earnings and (unexpected) security returns at the announcement 
dates. Unfortunately, Japanese MFs are disclosed simultaneously with the other earnings data. 
Consequently, it is not possible to control for other events in the manner employed by Waymire 
[1984] or Jennings [1987]. To assess the incremental relevance of MFs, however, we need to control 
for the "news" in UE. 
The available research on Japanese securities markets does not provide us with clear guidance as 
to which UE model to use. In addition to the random walk (RW) and MF models, we have periodic 
analyst forecasts (AFs) reported in the Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Nikkei).9 Security analysis in Japan 
has not developed in the same way as in the US or Britain. As a result, these forecasts frequently 
reflect the most recent MFs as extracted from interviews or other management disclosures. At the 
very least these AFs should reflect the MFs provided with the announcement of mid-year interim 
results. Possibly as a reflection of the relative importance of the parent-only statements, AFs are 
only available in machine-readable form from Nikkei for the parent earnings. We were also informed 
that analysts rarely provide forecasts of consolidated earnings. 
Based on the studies we have seen, it appears that there is little understanding of the relationship 
between (unexpected) returns and the different measures of UE.10 Consequently, we choose to 
analyze the question of MFs relevance for investors in two steps. 
First, we consider the impact of annual earnings announcements on returns using different 
measures of UE. Specifically we determine which of the three measures provides the strongest 
association between (abnormal) returns and UE. Brown, Foster and Noreen [1985] have shown that 
"the more timely the expectations model, the stronger the association between average cumulative 
abnormal returns and earnings forecast errors" (p.8). The oocond null hypothesis to be tested is 
9Nikkei is one of two major sources of analyst forecasts. The other is the rival publisher, the Toyo Keizai Shimbun. 
We do not have access to these forecasts in machine readable form, but do not expect that they would be very different 
given the nature of security analysis in Japan. 
10For a small sample of firms in the period 1976-1978, Kunimura [1986] shows that AFs are more accurate than 
the estimates based on interim earnings forecasts. 
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then based on the idea that there is no difference in the association between unexpected earnings 
and unexpected returns when management forecasts, analyst forecasts or forecasts based on a 
simple random walk model are used to measure expected earnings. The hypothesis will be formally 
specified in Section 5. 
Second, once the results of tests of the first step are obtained, we examine whether the MFs 
for the next period's earnings have any impact on the unexpected returns after controlling for the 
effect of UE. Again this question will be considered for both parent and consolidated forecasts, 
with the latter tests controlling for the results from tests of parent-only forecasts. Thus, formal 
specification of the hypothesis is also deferred to Section 5. 
3 Data and Sample Selection 
As stated, the primary research question is whether MFs of both parent and consolidated earnings 
contain marginal information for investors. Since consolidated data are relatively recent in Japan, 
the availability of MFs of consolidated earnings is the major constraint in selecting a sample. 
The Center on Japanese Economy and Business at Columbia University has a data base of 
parent and consolidated financial statement data, security prices and "attribute" data (including 
dividends and parent forecasts) compiled by Nikkei. The data base covers a maximum of 10 years 
(for prices) ending with August 1987. 
We first extracted all companies available on the consolidated data file, which runs from FYEs 
March 31, 1978 through May 31, 1987. As 59% of all the companies on the consolidated data 
file have March 31 FYEs we focussed our collection procedures on this subset of firms. We hand-
collected the announcement dates and management (consolidated) forecasts released at the time, 
for all companies with March 31 FYEs, as well as for companies with any other FYE whose 
announcements are published in the daily Nihon Keizai Shimbun in May, June or July of the 
relevant years. The Nikkei newspaper publication date is one day after the actual release of the 
Kessan Tanshin. 
The "attribute" files from Nikkei contain monthly parent-only forecasts and "update dates," 
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representing the dates on which Nikkei has discussed the company's potential results. In principle 
the forecasts represent AFs and the update dates reflect the dates on which the forecasts are first 
announced. However, we were told that the first update after the FYE represents the date of the 
announcement of earnings (i.e., the date of the Kessan Tanshin) and that this date's forecast is 
in fact the MF. Therefore, we selected the first update date at least 30 days after the FYE as 
the parent-only announcement date, and the forecast on that date as the MF for the parent-only 
earnings. Given that these are monthly date files and that the update date represents the last 
update in the month, we checked the dates and forecasts against those reported in the daily Nihon 
Keizai Shimbun to ensure that our information is accurate. We found, and corrected numerous 
differences in announcement dates, as a result of an announcement being earlier than the last 
update in a month, but found no differences in the forecasts. Thus even when there is an apparent 
update in AFs after the announcement of MFs in the same month the actual values of the forecasts 
do not change. 
Given that we are interested in both the parent and consolidated data, we exclude observations 
for which the parent and consolidated announcement dates are less than 12 trading days apart.11 
The attribute data files are also used to extract the AFs. We select the last update date and 
forecast prior to the FYE as the most recent AF prior to the announcement of earnings. Although 
many of these dates are within the month prior to the FYE, the forecasts may not have been revised 
since the interim forecast by managers. As previously indicated, even when the AF is more recent 
it is possible that the AF is based on some updated information from management, so that the 
reference to AFs should be interpreted cautiously. 
The final criterion used is that the price and attribute files contain data to calculate a sufficient 
number of returns to estimate the coefficients in the standard market model used in the abnormal 
returns analysis.12 The market model used is 
11A twelve day period is chosen because the event study part of this research considers a maximum window of-4 
to +4 days. 
"Although several studies using daily returns have used returns based on simple price changes (e.g., Chap. 4 in 
Sakakibara, et al. [1988]), the returns in this study include all dividends and appropriate adjustment factors. 
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where : 
Rit is the return (including dividends and adjustment factors) for firm i for day t, 
Rmt is the return on the equally-weighted index of firms in the first section of the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange for day t, 
oti and fa are firm specific parameters, and 
€n is the residual and is assumed to behave according to the standard assumptions. 
The model is estimated over the 180 days immediately preceding the maximum event window (-4 
to +4 days) considered for the announcement of parent-only earnings. Observations are dropped if 
there are less than 90 days of returns available to estimate the market model parameters. The event 
window is chosen to ensure that we minimize the impact of confounding signals between parent 
and consolidated announcements. 
The imposition of all the filters leads to a final sample of 1,300 observations. Table 1 shows 
the impact of the different selection criteria, while Table 2 provides some description of the char-
acteristics of the sample. Panel A of Table 2 indicates that most of the observations are in fiscal 
years 1985 through 1987, which reflects the increased presentation of consolidated data once the 
equity method was required. This period is characterized by unusually high increases in Japanese 
stock prices.13 Panel A also shows that there is a widespread distribution of observations across 
industries. The electronics industry, which has the largest number of firms, covers a range of spe-
cializations including general and heavy electric equipments, appliances, electronic controls and 
electric auto parts. 
The descriptive statistics presented in Panel B of Table 2 indicates, as we would expect, that 
the consolidated earnings are higher (by about 15%) than parent-only earnings. It is also apparent 
that, managers are generally optimistic in their forecasts, suggesting that the AFs may be the most 
accurate measure of expected earnings. 
13The TOPIX (Tokyo Stock Price Index) during this period started at a year-end high of 913.37 on December 28, 
1984 and went up to 2,258.56 on June 11, 1987. TOPIX is the index (100 on January 4, 1968) of the total market 
value of the stocks listed on the first section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange. 
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4 The Predictive Accuracy of Japanese Management Forecasts 
The first stage of our analysis of Japanese MFs considers their forecast accuracy. Separately for 
parent-only and consolidated earnings, we estimate two forecast errors: 
and 
where: 
A-t is the accounting earnings for the r type report [r = parent (p) or consolidated (c)] for 
firm i at year i, and 
MFA-t is management forecast of year t earnings for the r type report for firm t made at 
t-1. 
For each firm-year observation we also calculate the difference between the absolute value of 
the two forecast errors: 
We compute both parametric and nonparametric tests from drit. To reduce the influence of 
outliers we truncate drit at 1 (i.e., 100 percent). The mean of drit is the mean absolute forecast 
error frequently used as the test of forecast accuracy in other studies (e.g., Brown et al. [1987a]). 
Despite truncation, the parametric tests are sensitive to violations of the normality assumption. 
Thus we also compute the nonparametric Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test (Lehman [1975]) and the 
Fisher Sign Test (Hollander and Wolfe [1973]). The Sign Test ignores the magnitudes and reflects 
only the direction of predictive ability. 
Table 3 reports the results of the tests of predictive accuracy.—For parent-only earnings all 
mean and median differences are positive, and for the pooled as well as several yearly samples these 
differences are statistically significant. In three of the years the median difference is more than 5 
percent, so that on average, we can expect these differences to be economically significant. 
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The results based on consolidated earnings have a similar pattern, although the mean differences 
are generally lower than in the parent-only case. The differences for the pooled sample of 5.7 percent 
for the mean and 1.7 percent for the median are statistically significant. Also in four years the 
median difference is more than 5 percent. Interestingly the only year in which the Fisher Test 
indicates a significant number of negative differences (i.e., less accurate MFs) is in 1986. Given the 
concentration of March 31 FYEs, this probably reflects the unexpected appreciation of the yen in 
the last three quarters of 1985 and in early 1986.14 
The results presented in Table 3 clearly indicate that management forecasts are more accurate 
measures of expected earnings in most cases. Thus we can reasonably expect that investors use the 
MFs and that the correlation with security returns is higher for MFUE than for RWUE. 
5 The Relation between Unexpected Earn ings, Management Fore-
casts and Security Returns 
Before we can assert that MFs are indeed relevant, we have to consider whether investors actu-
ally utilize them. As the MFs are released simultaneously with historic earnings, we must first 
understand and control for any reaction to the (unexpected) earnings signals. Traditionally, the 
information content of an earnings signal has been evaluated by the association between a measure 
of unexpected earnings and unexpected returns (UR) (e.g., Beaver [1968]). The association tests 
are more complex in Japan because of the separate disclosures of parent-only and consolidated 
information, coupled with the availability of different measures of expected earnings. Thus we have 
to consider potential information sources in the following order: (1) unexpected parent-only (his-
toric) earnings, (2) MF of next period parent-only earnings, (3) unexpected consolidated (historic) 
earnings, and (4) MF of next-period consolidated earnings. 
14This period of rapid yen appreciation began in early 1985, but was given significant impetus by the meeting of 
the "Group of Seven" finance ministers in September 1985. 
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5.1 Tests of an Association between (Unexpected) Returns and Unexpected 
Parent-only Earnings 
We first examine the associations around the time of the announcement of parent-only earnings. 
We have three measures of unexpected parent-only earnings: 
where: 
AFApit is the last "analysts" forecast of year t parent-only earnings for firm i prior to 
the FYE, and 
Pp _5 is the price times shares outstanding for firm i on the day before the first date of the 
-4 to +4 day event window, i.e., 5 days prior to day s, the announcement date of 
parent-only earnings.15 
The null hypothesis tested is: 
#,£: There is no association between unexpected earnings and (unexpected) security returns 
so that there is no difference for random walk (RWUEPt), annual management forecast 
(MFUEpt) or latest analyst forecast (AFUEPt) based measures of unexpected earnings. 
The alternative hypothesis is that an association exists and that there is a difference. We expect 
that the association is highest for AFUEPt and lowest for RWUEPt. 
In all the return related tests, we have to define an appropriate measure of returns. In sim-
ilar tests using US data, the preference has been to use abnormal (unexpected) returns (ARa) 
calculated as: 
l s We deflate by the price times shares outstanding at the first day prior to the event window to reduce the potential 
measurement error in unexpected earnings and to be consistent with the valuation relation implicit in these tests 
(See Christie [1987]). We also ran the tests using |A, t | as the denominator (i.e., as in equations (2) and (3)) with 
little difference in the results. 
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where &{ and & are estimated from a standard market model as in equation (1) (e.g., Waymire 
[1984] and Baginski [1987]). AR+t is also frequently cumulated over a test period to obtain 
where T is the length of the test period. CARa has also been estimated using standardized 
abnormal returns (e.g., Morse [1981], Ishizuka [1987] and Burgstahler et al. [1989]), i.e., 
where S
€
. is the standard deviation of the residuals for the market model in the estimation period 
(equation (1)). 
We performed association tests using ARa, CARa and SCARa where a,- and /?,- are estimated 
as described in Section 3. Unfortunately, the market model does not seem to have much explanatory 
power in Japan (Sakakibara et al. [1988], Ch. 2; Maru et al. [1986], Ch. 4), particularly in certain 
periods. Looking at our own estimations for each firm, we often find a high variance from year 
to year in both R2 and the parameter estimates of the model. For example, Mitsui Mining has 
R2 = 0.10 and J3 = 2.75 for announcement date 5/23/86 and R2 = -0.01 and £ = -0.17 for 
announcement date 5/22/87. For the sample as a whole the mean beta is 1.32, the median is 0.60 
and more than 10% of the sample has a beta of greater than 2.5.16 
As a result of our discomfort with the fit of a market model to our sample we also consider the 
correlations between the unexpected earnings measures and raw returns, cumulative raw returns 
(CRH = YA=I A't)> market adjusted returns (MARa = Rit — Rmt) and cumulative market adjusted 
returns (CMARa = Y*t=i -WAR|'t)> as well as these measures standardized by the appropriate 
standard deviations calculated in the estimation period (e.g., SCMARa = ^ZMARn/SMARi)-
To test H 2$>, the firms are initially placed into ten portfolios based on ranking by UE. Different 
portfolios are established for each of the UE measures. We then calculate the mean and median 
cumulative (abnormal) returns within each portfolio, for four different event windows; (-4,+l), 
16Sakakibara et al. [1988] in their test of annual earnings announcements find similar results for their sample. In 
their full sample the average beta is 1.1, but when they remove observations for which the market model R2 < 0.05, 
the average beta jumps to 1.79. 
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(_4,+4), (-1,-1-1) and (0,+4). We consider the four event windows because of the perception tha t 
there is information leakage of the announcement and also a potential for slow adjustment to news 
(Sakakibara et al. [1988]). However the purpose of testing H^pisto ensure tha t we have adequately 
controlled for news in current earnings announced simultaneously with MF? t + 1 . Consequently, we 
are not really concerned with the vagaries of the event window, per se. Having considered all 
four event windows, we choose to report only the results for the (-1,-f-l) window as this minimizes 
the omitted variable problem and provides qualitatively equivalent results to those for other event 
windows.1 7 The results of the parent-only test are reported in Table 4. We report only the results 
using the standardized set of return measures (SCARpt and SCMARpt), as the other measures 
yield qualitatively similar results. 
The results provide evidence in favor of the alternative hypothesis tha t there is an association 
between UE and UR at the time of parent-only earnings announcements, and tha t the best measure 
of expected earnings is A F ? r The rank correlation between AFUEpt and SCARPt (SCMARpt) is 
0.059 (0.060), which is statistically significant and is higher than the equivalent correlations for the 
other UE measures. The pat tern of abnormal returns across portfolios follows a pat tern tha t can be 
viewed as broadly consistent with UE, but is certainly not uniform. For example, while the average 
of the abnormal returns is clearly higher for the top five portfolios compared to the bot tom five, 
portfolio 5 has a higher mean abnormal return than portfolios 2, 3 and 4. Similarly portfolio 8 has a 
large positive return despite negative unexpected earnings. This last result partially reflects positive 
outliers as the SCARpt (SCMARpt) for AFUEpt portfolio 8 is 0.002 (0.198).18 Nevertheless, the 
results reported in Table 4 suggest tha t we have an omitted variable or tha t there is a problem 
with short window association tests. 
Given the concerns about market model estimation expressed previously, one possibility is a 
misspecified asset pricing model, so we recommend caution in interpreting the SCARpt results. But 
other cumulative return measures provide similar pat terns. Another possibility is tha t net income 
17Of course information leakage or a post-announcement drift may exist if one looks outside the -4 to +4 day 
period, but this is beyond the scope of this paper as we are considering the market reaction to current earnings solely 
as a control for other information around the announcement of MF. 
18
 When we refer to portfolios we drop the i subscript from all earnings and return description. 
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contains transitory components that are discounted by investors.19 As previously indicated, we 
may not have a long enough window to capture information leakage or a post-announcement drift. 
Nevertheless, the purpose of the test is to control for news in UE. Thus, having found that AFUE?t 
is the best measure of unexpected earnings we can now consider the information content of parent-
only MFs, and see whether this is a candidate omitted variable. 
5.2 Tests of the Information Content of Management Forecasts of Parent-only 
Earnings 
The third null hypotheses (for parent MFs) is: 
Hg: There is no information in management forecasts of next-period parent-only earnings. 
The alternative hypothesis is that there is information in the MFs such that forecasted increases 
(decreases) in earnings lead to higher (lower) URs. 
As already stated, the MF of next period earnings are provided in the Kessan Tanshin, simul-
taneously with the announcement of historic earnings. Thus, to test for the information content in 
MFs we must control for "news" in the current earnings announcement. 
Hence, to test the hypothesis we first partition the observations into ten portfolios based on the 
magnitude of AFUE?t as reported in Table 4. Then within each AFUE\ portfolio we repartition 
the firms based on whether the MF predicts an increase or decrease in parent-only earnings for the 
next year. We compute the change in earnings using MF as: 
Within each AFVE\ based portfolio, we expect 
and eqnivalently for SCMARpt. These results are reported in Table 5. We see that for each 
AFUEf portfolio except portfolio 5 the abnormal returns for the sub-group of firms with positive 
"Although some Japanese researchers have used ordinary income as their measure of income for association tests, 
in Japan the difference between ordinary income and net income includes several items which would not be classified 
as extraordinary in many other countries including the United States. Consequently we choose to focus on net income. 
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AM FA pt+1 are higher than for those firms with negative AMFApt+v For the sample as a whole, 
the rank order correlations of AMFAPt+1 and abnormal returns are more than double those for 
AFUE?t (0.140 vs. 0.059 for SCARpit and 0.174 vs. 0.060 for SCMARPt).20 The results also show 
that for eight of the ten AFUEP portfolios the negative AMFAP+1 sub-portfolios have negative 
SCARP (SCMARP) and all the positive AMFEP+1 sub-portfolios have positive SCARP (eight 
out often portfolios for SCMARP). Of particular interest is the result for portfolio 8. In Table 
4 we report a surprisingly high positive mean SCARP (SCMARP). When we partition using 
AMFApt+1, we see that this is caused by a reaction to good news in the MF. 
The results presented in Table 5 clearly indicate that parent-only MFs have information content. 
This finding is consistent with the aforementioned belief that parent-only reports are important for 
users of Japanese financial reports. 
Having established the relevance of parent-only earnings announcements and MFs we next 
consider the corresponding questions for consolidated earnings. 
5.3 Tests of an Association between (Unexpected) Returns and Unexpected 
Consolidated Earnings 
Similarly to the analysis in Section 5.1, before we can consider the information content of MFs 
of consolidated earnings, we need to control for any information in the announcement of current 
earnings. As indicated, we have no analyst forecast for consolidated income as these are rarely 
made. Therefore, the two measures of unexpected earnings available are: 
where superscript c denotes consolidated and P^_5 is the price times shares outstanding on the 
day before the first date of the -4 to +4 day window for the consolidated earnings announcement. 
Consequently the second part of #2 i s : 
Hg: There is no association between unexpected consolidated earnings and (unexpected) security 
returns so that there is no difference for random walk (RWUE^t) or annual management 
20The rank order correlation between AFUEpit and AMFEpit+1 is -0.175. 
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forecast (MFUEcit) based measures of unexpected earnings, 
The alternative hypothesis is that an association exists and that there is a difference with a higher 
association expected for MFUE^. 
We use the same return measures as in the parent-only tests. Given the time pattern of dis-
closures (Figure 1), it is an open question as to how to partition the firms to test H^.. Ito [1988], 
in a study of annual return associations, partitions observations based on the sign of A?t — A^t_± 
and then on the sign of Acit — A^t-1. Using a short-event period, Ishizuka [1987], Komura [1988] 
and Sakakibara et al. [1988], consider the change in consolidated earnings as an independent signal 
and do not control for other information.21 Given our use of a short-event window with the sample 
partitioned so as to ensure that there are no overlapping days between the parent and consolidated 
windows, in Table 6 Panel A, we present mean values of SCAR ?t and SCMAR?t (for event window 
-1 to +1) for 10 portfolios partitioned using MFUE\t and RWUEcit. This provides us with a basis 
of comparison with the parent-only results presented in Table 4. 
The mean abnormal returns suggest that there is no clear pattern in the association between the 
returns and unexpected consolidated earnings measures. The results using SCAR^ and MFUEcit 
show that three of the five highest MFUE\ portfolios have negative abnormal returns while only 
two of the five lowest MFUE\ portfolios have negative abnormal returns. Even if we consider the 
averages of the top five and the bottom five portfolios, we find that these are indistinguishable. 
When we use RWUE\ as the measure of unexpected earnings the pattern improves in that three 
of the five highest (four of the five lowest) RWUE\ portfolios have positive (negative) abnormal 
returns. However, the order of the magnitudes of abnormal returns across the portfolios does not 
follow the pattern of the size of unexpected earnings. This is reflected in the small negative rank 
order correlations of 0.009 for MFUE\t and 0.011 for RWUEcit. When we consider the associations 
for SCMAR %t there is slightly more consistency as reflected in the positive rank order correlations 
of 0.038 for MFUE\t and a marginally significant (p = 0.058) 0.053 for RWUEcit. 
2 1
 Sakakibara et al. actually use Af-i x 1.05 as their measure of expected earnings. 
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The natural question that arises is why we find such poor associations between unexpected 
consolidated earnings and abnormal returns. As the consolidated earnings are so recent, when 
looking for comparative results in the literature, we could find only three previous studies dealing 
with reactions to the announcement of consolidated income and all considered the period 1978-
1984. Komura [1988] uses monthly returns and cannot reject a null hypothesis of no announcement 
effect. Ishizuka [1987] considers weekly returns and finds an announcement effect using squared 
SCAR ?t but does not differentiate according to the sign of unexpected earnings. Sakakibara et al. 
[1988] find an association using daily CARs and a simple good news/bad news split. However, they 
find that "the price adjustment to the consolidated earnings occurs on and after the announcement 
day" (p. 83), which, they suggest, "provides conclusive evidence that the Tokyo Stock Exchange is 
not all that efficient with respect to consolidated earnings information" (p. 90). Ishizuka's results 
also suggest that the market reacts slowly to consolidated earnings announcements. Consequently, 
we next consider whether a post-announcement window of 0 to +4 days provides us with a more 
clearly discernible pattern of associations between UR and UE.22 These results are reported in 
Panel B of Table 6. 
The rank order correlations (especially for SCMARcit and RWUE^t) and the inconsistent pat-
tern of mean values within each portfolio suggest that the results may be sensitive to outliers. Since 
this was found to be partially true, we only report the median values for the abnormal returns for 
the 0 to +4 event window. We also found that portfolio 10, i.e., the worst UE, seemed idiosyncratic, 
so we eliminated firms with negative consolidated earnings from all portfolios considered in Table 
6, Panel B.2 3 
Looking first at the rank order correlations, we see that for MFUEcit (RWUE^t) the correlations 
are 0.040 (0.009) for SCARcit and 0.075 (0.058) for SCMAReit, with the latter being statistically 
significant. The median value of SCMARcit is negative for all RWUE^ (nine out of ten for 
MFUEf) portfolios, but in general the returns are lower for lower UE portfolios. The average 
22For the - 4 to +1 event window the rank order correlations for SCMAR°it (SCARcit) are 0.026 (-0.006) with 
MFUE% and 0.048 (- 0.000) with RWUEcit. 
"Nei ther the median values nor removal of firms with negative earnings provided any clearer pattern of associations 
for the -1 to +1 event window so we have not reported these values. There was also no material impact on the parent-
only results from these adjustments. 
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SCMAR\t of the top five portfolios is higher than the average of the bottom five. Similar results 
exist for the SCAR^ portfolios. Thus, there still appears to be some other information affecting 
the returns. 
Before proceeding further, to ensure that we have some association between UE and UR, we 
consider the simple 2 x 2 frequency distributions based on the signs of the measures. The x2 
statistics from this test are reported in Table 7. Three of the four are significant with the only 
insignificant association being for the distribution based on the signs of SCMAReit and RWUEcit?* 
Given the negative values of the medians for most of the portfolios reported in Panel B of Table 6, 
these significant x2 statistics are surprising, and reaffirm that there is probably other information 
being priced by the market. 
One possibility is the relevance of MFs of next period earnings, which is the primary issue in 
this paper. However, another possibility is that unexpected parent-only earnings and AMFA^+1 
are omitted variables, that is, we are capturing a post-announcement effect from the parent-only 
values. To test this we partitioned the sample into eight portfolios based on a 4-way partition 
on AFUE?t and then a sub-partition on the sign of AMFE?t+1, similar to the process discussed 
in Section 5.2 and reported in Table 5.25 We then considered the abnormal returns around the 
consolidated earnings announcement date for these portfolios as well as new portfolios based on 
a further partition using (separately) the magnitudes of MFUEcit and RWUE?t (e.g., the eight 
AFUE\IAMF'Ef+1 portfolios were sub-partitioned using MFUEcit rankings). These results are 
not reported in the paper because they provide no additional insights. The x2 statistic for the 
frequency distribution based on the signs of SCARcit (0,+4) (SCMARcit (0,+4)) and AFUEpit is 
1.30 (2.19), which is not significant.26 
To summarize, we can (weakly) reject the H^ in that both RWUE\t and MFUE\t provide 
measures of unexpected earnings that are associated with unexpected returns, although it is difficult 
24Table 7 reports the x* statistics for the sample without observations with negative consolidated earnings. If these 
firms are retained, the x 2 statistics and significance levels increase for all four distributions. 
2 5
 We used an initial 4-way partition to ensure that we did not have too few observations in the final portfolios. 
2 6
 We also partitioned the sample into different years and evaluated the UE and UR association by year. There are 
differences across years, but the qualitative conclusions remain. Thus, we do no not report these statistics. 
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to distinguish between the two UE measures.2 However, the unexpected returns are not consistent 
with the magnitudes of either UE measure. As the objective of the analysis in this subsection 
is to establish the control variables to use in the test of the information content of MFs, the 
strength of the association between UE and unexpected returns is important but not itself critical. 
Consequently we consider next whether MFs of next period consolidated earnings are relevant, and 
whether they reduce the inconsistency, 
5.4 Tests of the Information Content of Management Forecasts of Consoli-
dated Earnings 
The third hypothesis for consolidated earnings can be simply stated as: 
Hg: There is no information in management forecasts of next-period consolidated earnings. 
The alternative hypothesis is that there is information in the MFs such that forecasted increases 
(decreases) in earnings lead to higher (lower) unexpected returns. 
To test this hypothesis we partition each of the ten portfolios formed using MFUEcit {RWUE\t) 
reported in Table 6 Panel B, based on whether the MF predicts an increase or decrease in con-
solidated earnings for the next year. We compute the change in consolidated earnings using MF 
as: 
Then within each MFUEct (RWUEct) portfolio, we expect 
and equivalently for SCMAR%. 
The results for the 0 through +4 day window are reported in Panels A and B of Table 8. 
For portfolios originally partitioned on the magnitude of MFVE% (i.e., in Panel A) we see that 
for SCAR\, in nine of the ten portfolios the median unexpected return is higher for the pos-
itive AMFAf+i than for the negative AMFA$+1 portfolios. Similar, though less pronounced, 
27The rank order correlation between RWUEcit and MFUE% is 0.69. 
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differences exist for SCMAR^. Of particular interest in the SCARl associations is the split for 
portfolios 2, 4, 5 and 9. In the high MFUE\ portfolios (2, 4 and 5), we see that the negative 
AMFA%+1 sub-portfolios (column 1 in Table 8, Panel A) actually have negative median values of 
-0.391, -0.526 and -0.601 respectively, while the positive AMFAct+l sub-portfolios (column 2 in 
Table 8, Panel A) have positive median values of 0.182, 0.008 and 0.049 respectively. A similar 
effect is seen in low MFUE\ portfolio 9. However, a note of caution is warranted as there are 
portfolios, in particular portfolio 7, in which the AMFA^t+1 has the opposite effect. 
Considering portfolios initially partitioned on the magnitude oi RWUE\ (Table 8 Panel B) we 
see that for seven of the ten RWUEcit portfolios, the median SCAR*} values are higher for positive 
AMFA%+1 sub-portfolios. Once again in portfolios 1, 2 and 3 we find negative (positive) medians 
of SCAR\ for the negative (positive) AMFA\ sub-portfolios. The results for the SCMAR\ values 
are similar although the size of the differences are smaller. 
Taken as a whole, we feel comfortable in rejecting H£., as the results in Table 8 provide reason-
able evidence that management forecasts of consolidated earnings are associated with unexpected 
security returns. However, the conclusion would possibly be stronger if we could more easily un-
ravel the associations between unexpected returns and unexpected current earnings. We believe 
that there are several factors at work that cannot be easily separated. First, and one potentially 
easy to evaluate is an extension of the event window. If the consolidated earnings are not quickly 
priced in the market, then we can expect more noise in short window association tests between UR 
and UE. However, acceptance of the notion of delayed pricing of information introduces a different 
set of concerns because it brings into question the relevance of a market price based association 
test. It also becomes more difficult to ensure that we have controlled for other information.28 
Second, and somewhat related, we have most of our observations in the period from 1985-
1987 (see Table 2). As noted earlier, this is a period of extraordinary growth in security prices 
(approximately 150 percent) without the same growth in earnings. Clearly, either the market was 
reacting to information other than earnings or an anomaly was occurring. 
28Extending the event window by one day to (0,+5) reduced the rank order correlations in all four combinations 
of UE and UR, e.g., the correlation between SCMAR cit and MFUE °it went from 0.075 to 0.070. 
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Furthermore, in part of this time Japan was faced with a potential crisis in its export industries 
because of the rapid appreciation of the yen, so we should expect increased earnings uncertainty. 
Thus, overall, we can reasonably expect the return series to be more noisy in this period than in 
the 1978-1984 test period of Ishizuka [1987] or Sakakibara et al. [1988].29 However, this problem 
should affect both parent and consolidated earnings. 
Third, we use net income as our measure of earnings. As previously explained, an alternative 
earnings number, ordinary income, excludes items which would reasonably be included as operating 
income in other countries. On the other hand, net income may include extraordinary items which 
can add noise to the UE classification. It is however possible that we could improve our associations 
by using the management forecast from the interim consolidated report. Given the specific objective 
of this research we did not feel it was necessary to try to improve the association between UE and 
unexpected returns by focusing on these two issues. 
Fourthly, there may be firm or industry characteristics which distort the association patterns, 
for example the historical accuracy of managers' forecasts. We shall begin investigating these 
possibilities in future research. 
Finally, given that the problems do not appear to exist for parent-only earnings, it is possible 
that Japanese investors do not yet rely on consolidated earnings for most companies. This is also 
a question for additional research. 
6 Summary and Conclusions 
In this paper we have demonstrated that (1) management forecasts of both parent and consoli-
dated earnings are generally more accurate than a simple random walk model; (2) the "analysts" 
forecast of parent-only earnings preceding the announcement date is the most accurate measure of 
unexpected earnings and is most closely associated with unexpected returns; (3) it is difficult to 
distinguish between management forecast and random walk measures of unexpected consolidated 
29For example, recall from Section 4 that RW outperformed MF for 1986. Removal of 1986 increases all four of 
the x* statistics reported in Table 7. However, as indicated the qualitative conclusions remain the same so in the 
interests of parsimony we do not report all the yearly tests. 
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earnings relative to their associations with unexpected returns; and (4) the sign of management 
forecasts of next period earnings are associated with unexpected returns for both parent and con-
solidated earnings. 
These findings have potential implications for both academics and market participants. First, 
for academics, we believe it is too simplistic to use simple random walk models as measures of 
unexpected earnings in studies of Japanese capital markets. Further, if one is interested in consid-
ering price reactions to accounting information, one should control for the concurrent (or, at least, 
latest) management and analyst forecast. 
Second, for market participants, we believe the results indicate a need to consider management 
and analyst forecasts in their investment decisions. Further, it would be foolish to ignore the 
parent-only accounting data, as these appear still to be relevant to Japanese investors. 
Third, studies of the PE anomaly should consider the management forecast, particularly if it 
indicates a large increase or decrease. Finally, for those interested in the globalization of financial 
markets, it seems reasonable to suggest that as Japanese influence continues to develop, it is 
possible that we shall see increasing interest in non-Japanese companies presenting some form of 
management forecast. 
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Figure 1: Flow of Information 
Mitsui Mining for 1986 
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Table 1: Summary of Sample Selection Procedure 
Observations available on consolidated da ta base 3,488 
Observations for which forecasts are not collected (1,205) 
Observations lost by lagging to obtain forecast errors (752) 
Observations lost from lack of parent forecast or 
consolidated and parent forecasts being too close (150) 
Observations without a sufficient return series (81) 
Final number of observations 1,300 
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Table 2: Description of the Sample of Firms 
Panel A: Industry and Annual Distribution 
Industry 87 86 85 84 83 82 8 
Foods 21 23 21 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Textile Products 13 26 19 1 1 1 1 1 
Paper &; Pulp 7 10 8 
Chemicals 29 40 39 3 2 2 - -
Drugs 5 8 6 1 1 - - - -
Petroleum 3 4 3 - - - 1 1 
Tires 3 5 4 
Clay and Glass Products 11 13 12 1 
Iron and Steel 16 19 18 1 - - 1 1 
Metal Products 17 27 27 2 1 - - - -
Machinery 20 35 30 5 3 1 1 1 
Electric Equipment 45 66 56 16 16 13 16 14 10 
Shipbuilding 2 5 4 1 1 1 1 1 
Motor Vehicles &; Parts 11 14 12 3 3 2 2 2 
Transportation Equipment 3 3 3 - - - 1 1 
Precision Instruments 9 15 14 4 3 3 3 3 2 
Other Manufacturing 5 6 6 
Marine Products 3 3 1 
Mining 3 5 5 
Construction 9 13 11 1 2 2 1 1 1 
Trading and Wholesale 27 30 28 10 11 11 10 3 -
Retail Stores 1 2 1 1 
Credit k, Leasing 3 3 2 1 1 1 - - -
Real Estate 7 7 4 
Railroad h Bus 9 13 12 
Trucking 7 8 7 
Sea Transportation 2 8 8 
Entertainment h Service 1 1 1 
80 79 
Total 292 412 362 53 47 39 41 31 23 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics for Earnings Variables 
1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile Mean SD 
1. Parent-only 
Apt 6.73 13.70 24.81 19.40 30.21 
MFAP 7.67 14.42 26.77 22.40 34.25 
MFApt+1 7.23 13.66 25.44 20.34 32.06 
AFAP 6.33 13.19 25.01 19.01 29.21 
2. Consolidated 
M 7.65 15.67 28.94 22.21 35.40 
MFA\ 9.30 17.62 31.80 26.53 40.70 
MFAct+1 8.63 15.79 29.80 23.96 37.23 
At is the earnings per share for year t. 
MFAt is the management forecast of year t earnings made at t — 1. 
AFAt is the last analyst forecast of year t earnings per share prior to the fiscal year end. 
SD is the standard deviation. 
p (c) denotes parent (consolidated) 
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Table 3: Results for Tests of Predictive Accuracy of 
Annual Management Forecasts Relative to a Random Walk Model (in %) 
PARENT-ONLY 
Pooled 6.4 8.94** - 2.6 2.6 13.4 _[_** 7.4*" 
1987 9.2 6.06** - 1.7 3.1 15.6 1 * * 4.1*" 
1986 1.4 1.03 - 10.8 0.0 8.6 + - 1.6 
1985 10.6 7.70** 0.0 7.0 19.6 1 * * 7.1*" 
1984 7.0 2.00* 0.1 4.1 12.7 1 * * 4.0*" 
1983 2.1 0.87 - 3.7 1.2 9.1 + 0.4 
1982 4.4 1.03 - 2.6 2.1 7.1 + 1.4 
1981 0.9 0.28 -4.5 1.7 11.2 + 1.7 
1980 13.1 3.46** 4.5 8.4 18.2 _!_** 4.9*" 
1979 8.4 1.84 0.2 4.6 10.8 + 2.7* 
CONSOLIDATED 
Pooled 5.5 7.45** - 2.8 1.6 13.6 i ** 3.4** 
1987 8.3 4.88** - 0.1 2.2 16.4 i ** 2.7 
1986 0.8 0.63 - 7.5 0.0 8.6 + - 4.3** 
1985 9.4 6.17** - 0.5 5.5 18.7 _!_** 5.6** 
1984 8.3 2.79** 0.1 6.9 18.6 1 * * q IT** 
1983 0.8 0.24 - 3.4 1.3 6.4 + 0.7 
1982 0.0 0.13 - 3.0 0.0 3.9 + -0.8 
1981 1.5 0.46 - 7.7 0.8 10.6 + 0.5 
1980 9.2 2.38* 2.8 7.1 17.1 _!_** 3.4** 
1979 6.5 1.32 - 1.4 6.7 14.0 + 1.9 
p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 
The differences in forecast errors are based on the random walk minus management forecast. Thus 
a positive (negative) sign indicates a more accurate management (random walk) forecast. 
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Table 4: Means and Rank Correlations for Portfolios 
Partitioned on the Basis of 
Different Measures of Unexpected Parent-only Earnings 
AFUEpt MFUEpt RWUEpt 
Portfolio UE? SCARpt SCMARpt UEp SCARP SCMARpt UEP SCARpt SCMARpt 
# (xlOO) (-!,+!) (-1.+1) (xlOO) (-1.+1) (-1.+1) (xlOO) (-1.+1) K+i) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
1 1.90 0.451* 0.284 2.76 0.264 0.135 6.43 0.147 0.077 
2 0.39 0.245 0.066 0.65 0.133 0.054 1.31 0.377* 0.227 
3 0.21 0.387** 0.143 0.34 0.422** 0.128 0.70 0.327* 0.073 
4 0.11 0.206 0.004 0.13 0.364* 0.125 0.40 0.195 - 0.022 
5 0.05 0.424** 0.148 0.03 0.159 0.038 0.19 0.265 0.050 
6 0.01 0.348* 0.211 - 0.07 0.109 - 0.313 0.06 0.085 - 0.059 
7 -0.01 0.081 - 0.239 - 0.29 0.224 - 0.012 - 0.14 0.192 0.047 
8 -0.13 0.498** 0.259 - 0.62 0.294 - 0.010 - 0.56 0.264 - 0.010 
9 - 0.29 - 0.090 - 0.229 - 1.18 0.100 - 0.062 - 1.32 0.319* 0.087 
10 - 1.74 0.100 0.043 - 5.15 0.581** 0.340* -6.03 0.478** 0.219 
Rank Order 
Correlation 0.059* 0.060* 0.005 0.036 - 0.014 0.021 
AFUEp is the difference between actual and latest "analyst" forecast of parent-only earnings year t 
divided by price times shares outstanding at time s — 5, where s is the day of announcement. 
MFUEP is the difference between actual and management forecast of parent-only earnings 
for year t divided by price times shares outstanding at time s — 5. 
RWUEP is the difference between actual (for year t) and last year's actual  
parent-only earnings divided by price times shares outstanding at time s — 5. 
SCARP is the standardized cumulative abnormal return for year t. 
SCMARP is the standardized cumulative market adjusted return for year t. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 for mean not equal to 0. 
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Table 5: Means and Rank Correlation of Adjusted Returns for 
Portfolios based on Analyst Forecast of Unexpected Earnings and 
the Management Forecast of Changes in Next Period Earnings 
Parent-only 
(N= 1,300) 
SCAR^ is the (portfolio) standardized cumulative abnormal return in year t. 
SCMARf is the (portfolio) standardized cumulative market adjusted return in year t. 
AMFA?t+1 is the difference between management forecast of parent-only earnings 
for firm i for year I + 1 and actual earnings in year t. 
** p < 0.01 
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Table 6: Summary Statistics for Portfolios 
Partitioned on the Basis of 
Different Measures of Unexpected Consolidated Earnings 
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Table 6 continued 
Panel B: Summary Statistics 
for Portfolios from Sample without Negative Consolidated Earnings 
(N=l,190) 
MFUEct RWUEct 
MFUEf is the difference between actual and management forecast of 
consolidated earnings divided by price at time s — 5. 
RWUE\ is the difference between actual and last year's actual 
consolidated earnings divided by price at time s — 5. 
SCARf is the standardized cumulative abnormal return for year t. 
SCMAR \ is the standardized cumulative market adjusted return for year t. 
* p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 
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Table 7: x 2 Statistics for the 2 x 2 Frequency Distributions 
of Portfolios Based on the Signs of 
Unexpected Earnings and Unexpected Returns 
Unexpected 
Earnings Measure 










Numbers in parentheses represent probabilities. 
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Table 8 Medians and Rank Correlations of Adjusted Returns for 
Portfolios based on Unexpected Earnings and 




Table 8 continued 
Panel B: Random Walk Unexpected Earnings 
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